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The Roman orator Cicero is credited with the phrase ―Silent 
enim leges inter arma‖—―When swords are drawn the laws fall 
silent . . . .‖1  The nature of counterinsurgency conflict belies 
Cicero‘s statement—in counterinsurgencies, laws must instead be 
vibrant and active in order to secure success.  Rather than a 
convenience that can be restored at the cessation of hostilities, the 
rule of law should play a fundamental role in the conflict.  While it 
may be possible for an incumbent power to succeed in a 
counterinsurgency without a strong focus on the rule of law, this 
success will likely come at an extremely high cost in terms of 
military resources, civilian life, and international legitimacy. 
1.1. Definitions 
This Comment will deal with terms such as 
―counterinsurgency‖ and ―the rule of law,‖ which have gained a 
certain cachet in contemporary discourse.  Yet, there can be 
significant disagreement on what these terms mean.  In some cases, 
this disagreement arises from confusion on the precise meaning of 
a broad phrase,2 while in other cases, multiple terms have been 
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1 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Milone, in CICERO: DEFENCE SPEECHES 162, 186 [¶ 
11] (D.H. Berry trans., Oxford World Classics 2000) (52 BCE). 
2 See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, How I Passed My U.S. Citizenship Test: By Keeping the 
Right Answers to Myself, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:31 AM), 
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used to cover closely related, yet distinct phenomena.  It is 
important to clarify what is meant by these critical terms, so that 
this Comment can progress without any confusion. 
1.1.1.  The Rule of Law 
In September 2010, the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
hosted a conference entitled Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and 
Afghanistan:  Challenges for the Coming Decade.3  Topics addressed at 
the conference included federalism, administrative law, and the 
integration of informal justice systems into a nation‘s judiciary, but 
all those present seemed to take the meaning of ―the rule of law‖ 
for granted.  While there is certainly a general understanding of 
what sorts of topics fall within the penumbra of ―the rule of law,‖ 
namely topics dealing with governance and legitimacy, the 
protection of human rights, and a functional and effective legal 
system, the precise definition is vague.  In their work Can Might 
Make Rights? Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks 
liken the state of the term ―rule of law‖ to Justice Potter Stewart‘s 
definition of obscenity—an ―I know it when I see it‖ quality, 
intuitively understood but not clearly defined.4 
An obvious question then arises:  Why is defining the rule of 
law important?  Does the generalized understanding not suffice?  
As Stromseth and her co-authors pointedly note, ―as a guide to 
making intelligent policy decisions, ‗I know it when I see it‘ is not 
terribly effective.‖5  The idea of the rule of law playing a central 
role in the resolution of foreign policy issues is long-standing and 
widespread,6 but varying interpretations of the phrase amongst 
 
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-i-passed-my-us-citizenship-test-by-
keeping-the-right-answers-to-myself (discussing varying perspectives of the term 
―rule of law‖). 
3 See Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges for the Coming 
Decade, Agenda, PENN LAW (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.law.upenn.edu 
/international/conferences/ruleoflaw/agenda.html (providing a description of 
the topics and speakers present at the University of Pennsylvania Law School‘s 
symposium). 
4 JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF 
LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 56 (2006) (discussing the elusiveness of the 
term ―rule of law‖ and the importance of defining it). 
5 Id. at 57. 
6 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Promoting the Rule of Law in the Post-Cold War Era, in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3,  4–6 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds., 
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policy planners and administrators7 has the potential to severely 
damage efforts to implement such an ill-defined goal. 
The primary competing definitions of the rule of law are 
centered on whether the phrase should simply mean the ―formal 
and structural components‖ present within a legal system and 
society‘s recognition of it, or encompass both structural 
components and ―particular substantive commitments.‖8  Thomas 
Nachbar, in his article Defining the Rule of Law Problem, chooses a 
maximalist, substantive approach, and distills U.S. military 
doctrine on the definition of the rule of law into seven categories: 
state monopolization of force, security of person and property, law 
constraining state action, stable and clear law, individual recourse 
to a fair legal system, protection of basic human rights, and daily 
reliance on legal institutions.9  While others present somewhat 
different criteria (for instance, replacing state monopolization of 
force with a broader ―military and security systems that function 
under the law‖10), Nachbar‘s criteria bear the greatest resemblance 
to those used by the U.S. military, and will be used for the 
purposes of this Comment.11 
 
2001) (describing the need for rule of law promotion in U.S. foreign policies 
supporting democratic reform). 
7 See, e.g., TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 9 (2010) (supporting the idea that 
the rule of law does not require an unqualified admiration of the law but which 
accepts that people would rather live with the rule of law); STROMSETH ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 58–61 (describing the surge in rule of law promotion by the United 
States and other countries); JORIS VOORHOEVE, FROM WAR TO THE RULE OF LAW: 
PEACEBUILDING AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 96 (2007) (noting the growth of 
international assistance for legal reform during the 1990s and the importance of 
recognizing the different legal systems to which such assistance is provided); 
Grant Kippen & Scott Worden, Election Aftermath and the Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan, FOREIGN POL‘Y, AFPAK CHANNEL (Jan. 21, 2011, 10:47 AM), 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/21/election_aftermath_and_the_
rule_of_law_in_afghanistan (discussing how corruption in Afghanistan‘s 2011 
elections undermines the rule of law). 
8 STROMSETH, supra note 4, at 70–71 (noting that the minimalist conception of 
the rule of law emphasizes formal and structural components whereas the 
substantive theories insist on particular substantive commitments, for instance, to 
human rights). 
9 Thomas B. Nachbar, Defining the Rule of Law Problem, 12 GREEN BAG 303, 
306–307 (2009). 
10 VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 91. 
11 In fact, Nachbar‘s article was developed from Chapter 2 of Rule of Law 
Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide for Judge Advocates, published in 2008 by The Judge 
Advocate General‘s Legal Center & School, U.S. Army and the Center for Law and 
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 1.1.2.  Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
In contrast to the debate surrounding the meaning of the term 
rule of law, the meanings of the terms ―warfare‖ and ―insurgency‖ 
remain relatively stable.  Carl von Clausewitz famously stated in 
his work On War that ―war is not merely an act of policy but a true 
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried 
on with other means.‖12  This definition holds true for all wars, but 
perhaps most so for the subsets of irregular warfare known as 
insurgency and counterinsurgency.  As the U.S. Army field manual 
on counterinsurgency notes, insurgencies are ―politico-military 
struggle[s] designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an 
established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control.‖13  Thus, insurgencies 
(and counter-insurgencies—actions taken to oppose an insurgent 
movement) are violent struggles for political supremacy between 
an insurgent group and an incumbent. 
Clausewitz defines war as ―an act of force to compel our enemy 
to do our will.‖14  Compulsion and will are at the heart of conflict.  
The ability of one party to outlast the other and to persist in 
conflict beyond the ability or will of its opposition provides that 
party with victory.  Insurgencies are set apart from other conflicts 
by the resources that both the incumbent and the insurgent use to 
fight the conflict.  Rather than seeking to achieve a political end 
primarily through the control of territory, the two sides are 
competing for control over and support of the population.15  The 
populace functions as both the resource and the objective for the 
 
Military Operations.  The Handbook has since been superseded by the 2010 edition, 
to which this Comment will refer.  Nachbar, supra note 9, at 303. 
12 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 99 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. 
and trans., 1993) (1832). 
13 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY, 
(2006), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf. 
14  CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 83. 
15 See Octavian Manea, Interview with Dr. John Nagl, SMALL WARS J. 1, 2 (Nov. 
11, 2010, 10:35 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/599-
manea.pdf [hereinafter Nagl Interview] (―The counterinsurgent and insurgent are 
both competing to win the support of the population.‖). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6
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two sides,16 with both insurgent and incumbent attempting to 
obtain and secure the population‘s allegiance.17 
This unique dynamic is why the reporter and 
counterinsurgency expert Bernard Fall noted from his observations 
in Vietnam that ―[w]hen a country is being subverted it is not 
being outfought; it is being outadministered.‖18  Fall saw the North 
Vietnamese National Liberation Front seeking to neutralize the 
Saigon government‘s administrative power, and thus its already 
tenuous connection with the populace, by eliminating village 
chiefs and replacing them with their own leaders.19  Fall‘s 
observation gets to the heart of one of the crucial dynamics in 
counterinsurgency—a competition to provide the population with 
control and an established government.20 
Clausewitz also mentions that ―the defensive form of warfare is 
intrinsically stronger than the offensive‖ because of several factors:  
delay benefiting the defender, the conservation of force in defense, 
and the passive objective of defense.21  In considering the dynamics 
of insurgencies, it is important to consider that the incumbent 
generally assumes the role of the attacker rather than defender.  
Even though the incumbent may appear to have political and 
military control over its territory, and will certainly claim such, the 
blunt truth is that, if this were the case, there would be no 
insurgency.  The incumbent must persuade the population that its 
control and government are superior; the insurgent is successful if 
they are capable of frustrating the incumbent‘s design.  The 
 
16 See DAVID GALULA, PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1956–1958, at 246 (2006) 
(explaining that destroying an insurgent‘s forces and occupying its territory is 
ineffective without gains in support from the population under control). 
17 See DOUGLAS PIKE, VIET CONG: THE ORGANIZATION AND TECHNIQUES OF THE 
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM 287 (1966) (―Administration in the 
liberated area, above all else, was an effort to create and maintain a population 
devoid of disenchantment, immune to GVN influence, and in fact hostile to any 
anti-NLF activity regardless of source.‖). 
18 BERNARD FALL, LAST REFLECTIONS ON A WAR 220 (1967). 
19 See id. at 218–219 (noting that the village chiefs‘ deaths were clustered in 
areas where the Communists alleged violations of a cease-fire agreement). 
20 See, e.g., David Axe, New Afghanistan Plan: Hole Up in Fortress Districts, 
WIRED (Mar. 29, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011 
/03/new-plan-for-afghanistan-fortress-districts/ (examining divisions between 
supporters of the NATO and Afghan coalition and the insurgency in 
Afghanistan‘s Baraki Barak district). 
21  CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 428. 
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incumbent is generally forced into the position of the attacker, of 
being presented with a positive task (establishing governance), 
because of prior circumstance that has already cost it the support 
of the population.22 
There is a school of counterinsurgency strategy that this 
Comment does not address.  In 1982, in response to a growing 
revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama,23 Syrian 
President Hafez al-Assad ordered a brutal strike on the city, killing 
up to 20,000 people24 and halting the Brotherhood‘s revolt, which 
was comprised of an estimated two hundred fighters.25  While 
certainly effective at quelling the insurgency, the human costs were 
appalling.  The mass killing of a population, as seen at Hama, is 
fundamentally against the laws of war as practiced by the 
international community, and violates the Hague Convention, 
which enshrined the laws of war,26 and the Fourth Geneva 
 
22 See ANTHONY JAMES JOES, RESISTING REBELLION: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 24 (2004) (explaining how a popular election can bring about 
peaceful power transitions, but can also, in its absence, bring about insurgency).  
When referring to Joes‘s work, one must take caution in his use of the term 
―guerrilla warfare‖ as being synonymous with an insurgency.  Cf. FALL, supra note 
18, at 210 (―[R]evolutionary warfare equals guerrilla warfare plus political action. . 
. . [E]verybody knows how to fight small wars. . . . Political action, however, is the 
difference.‖).  While Fall rejects the terms ―insurgency‖ and ―counterinsurgency‖ 
in favor of ―revolutionary warfare,‖ id., counterinsurgency has gained enough 
traction in discourse that it is preferable in this context to ―revolutionary warfare.‖  
See, e.g., DAVID C. GOMPERT & JOHN GORDON IV, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: BUILDING 
COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY 76 (2008) (―[T]he 
U.S. government tends to come to grips with insurgencies only after they become 
threatening.‖). 
23 See David Hirst, Stability Without Hope, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Dec. 21, 
1982, at 11 (examining the legacy of the 1982 Hama massacre in Syria). 
24 See Robert Fisk, Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights in Syria, 
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion 
/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-freedom-democracy-and-human-rights-in-syria-
2080463.html (discussing the Hama massacre and interviewing the son of the 
Syrian commander at Hama). 
25 See SYR. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., THE MASSACRES OF HAMA: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.shrc.org/data 
/aspx/d0/1260.aspx#D1 (last updated Feb. 19, 2004) (detailing the atrocities that 
occurred at Hama, and examining whether these atrocities were ―committed to 
enforce the law and preserve order or just to save the regime‖). 
26 See Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 25–27, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (discussing the treatment of sieges in 
international law, prohibiting assaults on undefended towns, and stating that ―all 
necessary steps should be taken to‖ avoid destruction of non-military targets). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6
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Convention, which set protections for civilian populations.27  
Destroying an entire city in order to halt the actions of two 
hundred individuals violates all principles of proportionality and 
is fundamentally illegitimate.  While the massacre may have 
secured al-Assad‘s regime against the Muslim Brotherhood, this 
Comment presupposes that the incumbent is acting in pursuit of 
legitimate ends and within the bounds of international law. 
A counterpoint to this line of reasoning is that the Hama 
massacre was initiated by a state against its own populace and 
therefore the conventions discussed above do not apply.28  
However, this thinking is fundamentally shortsighted.  The Hague 
and Geneva Conventions have entered the realm of customary 
international law; as they were designed and intended to provide 
constraints on the use of force by states, it is only logical that these 
constraints be applied to internal conflicts, such as insurgencies. 
1.2. Rule of Law and Counterinsurgency—Why is There Tension? 
A successful counterinsurgency generally requires winning the 
loyalty of the population away from the insurgency through 
superior provision of security and governance—two criteria that 
integrate well with the factors required for establishing the rule of 
law.29  However, the incumbent‘s methods for establishing security 
for the population, especially the use of force against the 
insurgency, can often cut against, or even directly oppose, the 
requirements of legitimate governance.  For example, the enforced 
uprooting and resettling of populations, as was done throughout 
twentieth-century insurgencies (to deny insurgencies population 
 
27 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (discussing 
grave breaches of the Convention, including willful killing not justified by 
military necessity). 
28 See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian 
Law, 62 A.F. L. REV 1, 33–34 (2008) (suggesting, through analogous reasoning, that 
―customary law, not treaty law,‖ governed America‘s 2003 invasion of Iraq). 
29 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the challenges 
counterinsurgents face in winning over the population).  But see Octavian Manea, 
Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview 
with Colonel Gian Gentile, SMALL WARS J. 1, 1 (Dec. 14, 2010, 7:37 PM), 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf 
[hereinafter Gentile Interview] (suggesting that population-centric 
counterinsurgency is not the only way to combat counterinsurgencies). 
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centers to subvert or control),30 cuts against the ‗property security‘ 
and ‗constraint of state action‘ categories within Nachbar‘s 
categorization of the rule of law.  Insurgent groups are not as 
constrained by the same need for legitimacy, and are thus more 
likely to ―use violence, intimidation, and terror to coerce support 
from the population.‖31  Furthermore, the use of force against 
insurgents often leads to destruction of infrastructure and civilian 
casualties, hampering the counterinsurgency effort, but also 
inhibiting establishment of the rule of law (particularly the 
components of security and human rights guarantees).32 
Requirements of the rule of law can also pose problems for the 
practice of counterinsurgency.  For example, it is difficult to say 
that a judicial system is fair or reliable where former insurgents are 
are allowed to go free and to avoid any legal punishment for 
actions they may have taken as insurgents.  However, to achieve a 
cease-fire and provide security, an incumbent may be forced to 
extend amnesty and forego holding insurgents accountable, as well 
as co-opt less committed insurgents through political 
accommodation and acceptance.33  Similarly, requiring criminal 
prosecution significantly complicates the procedure for detaining 
suspected insurgents.  Along with planning the use of force 
required to capture the insurgent, the incumbent will also need to 
 
30 See, e.g., JOES, supra note 22, at 106–113 (detailing resettlement efforts in 
countries with significant guerilla insurgencies); see also NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT 
SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 309 (1988) (discussing the 
Strategic Hamlet Program of forced relocations instituted by the South 
Vietnamese government). 
31 Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 2. 
32 See Spencer Ackerman, Twenty-Five Tons of Bombs Wipe Afghan Town Off 
Map, WIRED (Jan. 19, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom 
/2011/01/25-tons-of-bombs-wipes-afghan-town-off-the-map/ (noting that 
―property destruction . . . reset[s] the clock on any nascent positive impressions‖).  
But see Paula Broadwell, Travels with Paula (III) Arghandabis Like the Coalition 
Reconstruction Efforts, FOREIGN POL‘Y, THE BEST DEFENSE (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:26 PM), 
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/23/travels_with_paula_iii 
_arghandabis_like_the_coalition_reconstruction_efforts (arguing that property 
destruction from airstrikes does not ―necessarily lead to setbacks in the 
operational design or overall strategy‖). 
33 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that ―insurgencies are rarely 
defeated militarily‖ but instead ―end through political accommodation‖); see also 
ANGELIKA SCHLUNCK, AMNESTY VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY: THIRD PARTY 
INTERVENTION IN DEALING WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 248 (2000) (citing the ―long tradition in Latin and 
Central America‖ of providing amnesty to those who commit political crimes). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6
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consider additional factors, such as whether the insurgent has 
committed a crime or whether there is sufficient evidence for a 
court to convict the insurgent.34 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY  
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The process of establishing the rule of law after a conflict 
occurs has been investigated by many scholars.  Unfortunately, a 
dichotomy is often presented between armed conflict and the rule 
of law,35 suggesting that efforts to establish the rule of law can only 
begin once a conflict has ended36—a viewpoint made especially 
ironic by citing examples of ongoing conflicts under the post-
conflict heading.37  The argument goes that the rule of law requires 
social order and that social order requires an established 
government with all conflict ended.38 
This theoretical approach ignores the practical realities of a 
society and its existence; any society, even one embroiled in 
conflict, will still require some method of a legal system.  The 
process of establishing the rule of law, or indeed any major change 
within the system of a society, cannot be taken in a strictly linear 
fashion.39  As Charles Norchi notes, ―[s]ecurity is the precondition 
 
34 See Richard Morgan, The Law at War: Counterinsurgency Operations and the 
Use of Indigenous Legal Institutions, 33 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV 55, 67 (2010) 
(indicating that precursors to arrest in a criminal justice system may threaten the 
secrecy of counterinsurgency operations and that detention by a foreign military 
may disrupt criminal prosecution of the detained). 
35 See, e.g., Fairlie Chappuis & Heiner Hänggi, The Interplay Between Security 
and Legitimacy: Security Sector Reform and State-Building, in FACETS AND PRACTICES 
OF STATE-BUILDING 31, 32–33 (Julia Raue & Patrick Sutter eds., 2009) (describing 
security sector reform as a means of re-establishing security and restoring 
legitimacy in a post-conflict environment). 
36 See VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 53–54 (analogizing ―[p]ost-conflict 
peacebuilding‖ to emergency care, where there is a brief crucial time in which re-
establishing security and public order is often carried out ―without a complete 
legal basis‖). 
37 See, e.g., STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 85–133 (examining instances of 
―post-conflict governance‖ but extending this term to ongoing conflicts). 
38 See VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 121–22 (noting that the role of social order 
in small group societies and the subsequent growth of modern states is a good 
development only if these states contribute to a ―high quality of human life‖). 
39 See FRANK HERBERT, DUNE 30 (Ace Books 1999) (1965) (―‗A process cannot 
be understood by stopping it.  Understanding must move with the flow of the 
process, must join it and flow with it.‘‖). 
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of effective legal reform, yet security itself is dependent on the 
formal existence, at least, of operational law and state 
institutions.‖40  Security and the rule of law operate in a synergistic 
relationship, with success (or failure) in one directly affecting 
progress in the other.  Scott Dempsey, a former development 
officer in Afghanistan‘s Helmand province, has commented that 
―the only meaningful metric for success [in counterinsurgency] is a 
transfer of sustainable sovereignty to the institutions we can easily 
create, but which the Afghans must learn to run.‖41  This 
resumption of state function can only happen if the rule of law is 
incorporated as a simultaneous goal of counterinsurgency, rather 
than a task to be undertaken after security has been established. 
2.1. Counterinsurgency and Legitimacy—Why Establishing the Rule 
of Law Assists Counterinsurgency 
As discussed supra Section 1.1.2, counterinsurgency is focused 
on ―out-governing‖ the insurgency—ensuring that the population 
is provided with security, stability, and access to effective 
governance.  By taking measures to promote the rule of law, an 
incumbent can provide a population with more effective and 
trustworthy institutions, increasing the incumbent‘s legitimacy and 
making an increasingly persuasive case that working with the 
incumbent is the best option available to the population.  
Establishing trustworthy, fair, and reliable governance is one of the 
most compelling ways to encourage popular support for the 
incumbent, or, at a minimum, to prevent the insurgent from 
establishing its own reputation for governance and superseding 
the incumbent‘s control.42 
By supplying the population of an area with a government that 
it considers legitimate and capable of providing essential services 
in basic and fundamental areas, the population will be more likely 
 
40 Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Building: An Introduction, 
60 ME. L. REV. 281, 291 (2008). 
41 Scott Dempsey, The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer’s Frustration, SMALL WARS J. 
1, 2 (Mar. 11, 2011, 10:50 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/10354. 
42 See, e.g., Abu Muqawama, Special Abu Muqawama Q&A with Nick Blanford, 
CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., ABU MUQAWAMA (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/11/special-abu-muqawama-
qa-nick-blanford.html (discussing the provision of social welfare services, 
education, and medical aid as part of a non-state actor‘s strategy for building 
long-term popular support). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss3/6
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to consider the incumbent as being capable of providing security 
and governance in the long term.43  Furthermore, by demonstrating 
that the government is legitimate and functioning in a clear and 
above-board manner, the incumbent may begin to dispel some of 
the complaints that may have initially fueled the insurgency.  
Success often leads to further success; by gaining popular support, 
an incumbent is increasingly capable of exerting greater political 
control over the population and controlling the insurgency. 
2.2. Counterinsurgency and Security—How a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Assists the Rule of Law 
As a counterinsurgency provides increased security and safety 
to a population,44 it strengthens societal institutions that relate 
directly to the rule of law.  The basic provision of security requires 
not only military control, but political control as well—a control 
established through a functional police force and judiciary.45  While 
support for the police and judiciary is primarily intended for 
increasing individual security by curtailing crime and ensuring 
that the populace retains confidence in the government, this 
support also aids rule of law efforts by ensuring that the tools for 
expanding and supporting the rule of law are secured and extant.46 
However, merely strengthening institutions is insufficient to 
properly help establish the rule of law.47  Along with providing 
 
43 See Octavian Manea, Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen (Nov. 7, 2010, 6:43 
PM), SMALL WARS J. 4, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-
temp/597-manea.pdf [hereinafter Kilcullen Interview] (―Deiokes is a story about 
how a local tribal elder becomes powerful in his own area, by mediation and 
dispute resolution, and issuing judgments that gain the support of population.‖). 
44 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (examining ways that an incumbent 
can gain popular support by providing security through political 
accommodation). 
45 See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 142–44 (noting that security tasks vary 
among post-conflict environments, but that they usually entail protection of 
political leaders, demobilization of belligerents, control of crime, and protection of 
local infrastructure). 
46 See id. at 184 (noting that support for these judicial bodies with the aim of 
encouraging security may risk compromising other goals of an effective judicial 
system). 
47 See, e.g., Chappuis & Hänggi, supra note 35, at 45 (―[R]eforms aimed solely 
at modernising and professionalising the security forces and thereby increasing 
their capacity without ensuring their democratic accountability are not consistent 
with the [Security Sector Reform] concept.‖). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
06 KAZMI (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2012  11:23 AM 
882 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:3 
direct support to rule of law institutions like the police, prison, and 
judiciary, a successful counterinsurgency is also likely to increase 
the efficacy of governmental administration and the provision of 
justice.  For example, the RAND Corporation‘s 2010 volume 
Reconstruction Under Fire:  Case Studies and Further Analysis of Civil 
Requirements identifies the provision of ―equal access to justice for 
all Iraqis‖48 as a critical area for improving Iraq‘s Anbar province.  
RAND calls for direct assistance to rule of law institutions,49 but 
also identifies access to justice for the Sunni population as a 
fundamental need for establishing security in the area.  The report 
further provides suggestions for how Sunni access to justice in the 
long term can be implemented.50  This effort to strengthen the rule 
of law may be a part of counterinsurgency operations by happy 
accident, rather than explicit design, but it is present nonetheless. 
2.3. Entwined Failures—How Failures in One Branch Affect the Other 
Just as successes in counterinsurgency can assist the rule of law 
and vice versa, failures in one can lead to ongoing problems in the 
other.  Failures in providing security can result in catastrophes in 
implementing the rule of law.  One stark example of this is Iraq in 
the wake of the American invasion.  As Phillip James Walker 
describes: 
Through looting, Iraq lost its law.  Literally, no intact copy 
of the Iraqi law remained in the Ministry of Justice or any 
other public location in Baghdad.  Iraq lost 80 years of 
reported cases.  Iraq lost property records.  It lost records of 
government proceedings.  In the months after the looting, 
 
48 BROOKE STEARNS LAWSON ET AL., RECONSTRUCTION UNDER FIRE: CASE STUDIES 
AND FURTHER ANALYSIS OF CIVIL REQUIREMENTS 118 (2010). 
49 The RAND study identifies among the civil requirements of 
counterinsurgency activities: 
Establish a rule-of-law complex [which] would be a ―heavily fortified 
compound to shelter judges and their families and secure the trials of 
some of the most dangerous suspects‖. . . . Deliver . . . desks, podiums, 
beds and housing shelters for judges and their families, lawyers, legal 
assistants, prisoners, and witness . . . . Train . . . civil servants involved in 
the judicial process . . . with high professional and ethical standards . . . . 
Provide technical assistance . . . in the form of legal advice . . . . 
Id. at 120. 
50 Id. at 119 (arguing in support of decentralized justice and noting that a 
majority of the judiciary and police appointees are Shi‘a and located in Baghdad). 
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Ministry of Justice employees reassembled some of the lost 
documents, painstakingly collating the thousands of pages 
scattered haphazardly throughout the Ministry of Justice.  
However, even with a heroic effort by Ministry staff, a great 
deal had been lost.  In a sense, Saddam, war, and looting 
undermined the very foundations of the Iraqi state.  Not 
only did Saddam‘s government collapse; the building 
blocks of government—all government—also collapsed.  
Saddam took the state down with him.51 
While Walker attributes this failure to Saddam Hussein rather than 
the American forces present, he does concede one page later that 
this was a ―Coalition failure to stop the looting.‖52  This failure to 
provide sufficient security led to a disruption of the entire state 
governance apparatus, destroying the continuity of the state. 
Conversely, failures in hewing to the rule of law can lead to 
disasters in the counterinsurgency.  In June 1956, Robert Lacoste, 
the French governor-general of Algeria, executed two members of 
the National Liberation Front (FLN) insurgency, in reprisal for an 
ambush and destruction of a French platoon the month before.53  
Lacoste‘s action, taken in large part to placate the pied-noir 
population‘s desire to exact revenge,54 ultimately spurred many 
Algerians to join the FLN and helped to spark the FLN bombing 
campaign known as the Battle of Algiers.55 
One problem that can arise in counterinsurgency is that the 
population avoids commitment to one side or the other, but prefers 
to ―hedge [its] bets‖ and utilize the governance of both insurgent 
and incumbent, depending on which party is ascendant at the 
time.56  This does not arise from a desire to prolong the conflict, 
although it will likely have that effect; instead, it is a survival 
 
51 Phillip James Walker, Iraq and Occupation, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? 
APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 259, 271 (David Wippman 
& Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). 
52 Id. at 272. 
53 See ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954–1962, at 153 
(1977) (detailing the challenges associated with the counterinsurgency in Algeria). 
54 See id. at 183 (examining Lacoste‘s possible motives). 
55 See id. at 153, 185 (examining the fallout from Lacoste‘s response).  
56 See Benjamin Wittes, More Response to Brig. Gen. Martins, LAWFARE (Dec. 7, 
2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/more-response-to-brig-
gen-martins (explaining the strategic dimension to counterinsurgency and alliance 
formation).  
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strategy based on the fact that these civilians ―are surrounded from 
all sides by . . . people demanding their allegiance—and willing to 
hurt them if they don‘t get their allegiance.‖57  However, this does 
not necessarily mean that the population is equally likely to 
support either side.  It can just as easily be that the population is 
balancing the risks of supporting the insurgency58 against striking 
out against a government it despises.59  Even if the incumbent 
manages to gain control over a territory, there is no guarantee that 
this control will persist once the incumbent‘s forces leave.60  Great 
care must be exerted to ensure that any changes wrought by 
incumbent forces will persevere once direct military presence in a 
territory is withdrawn.61 
3. PITFALLS—POSSIBLE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
3.1. Detention, Interrogation, and Torture:  Short-term Security or 
Legitimacy? 
An incumbent is faced with extremely difficult choices during a 
counterinsurgency.  While external threats are relatively easy to 
isolate and deal with directly, an insurgent group is an amorphous 
and inherently clandestine organization.  Engaging a successful 
insurgent movement primarily through military force may be 
analogized to punching water—while there may be significant 
impact at given points, the bulk of the insurgent forces will seek to 
 
57 Kilcullen Interview, supra note 43, at 3. 
58 See DAVID W.P. ELLIOTT, THE VIETNAMESE WAR: REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN THE MEKONG DELTA 1930–1975, at 127 (2007) (noting that the populace 
of the Mekong Delta favored the Communist insurgency, but were not willing to 
directly support it when this meant risking the security and safety of the village). 
59 See Stathis N. Kalyvas & Matthew Adam Kocher, How “Free” is Free Riding 
in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem, 59 WORLD POL. 
177, 191 (2007) (concluding that nonparticipation in an insurgency can be even 
more costly than siding with either insurgent or incumbent). 
60 See Josh Boak, In Rural Afghan Village, Local Security Takes Root, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030103947.html (―‗As soon as the Marines leave 
Helmand province, the people will fight the government,‘ said Commander 
Sarwar . . . [of] the Afghan National Police.‖). 
61 See id. (noting the transience of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan‘s 
Helmand province).  
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flow away from the engagement, disperse and strike other areas.62  
Because of this elusive nature inherent to insurgencies, it becomes 
crucial for the incumbent to gain intelligence about the insurgency.  
This will generally involve the detention and interrogation of 
suspected insurgents. 
The detention policies applied to suspected insurgents have 
become a point of significant controversy in the United States, 
especially as a result of the prisoner abuses perpetrated at the Iraqi 
prison Abu Ghraib63 and the legal questions regarding detainee 
treatment and due process at Guantanamo Bay.64  Indeed, the 
detainee abuse present at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib has led to 
a significant loss of trust and faith—both at home65 and, crucially, 
abroad66—in the capacity of the American government to act in an 
 
62 Cf. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 581.  Clausewitz offers a charming 
alternate analogy: 
A general uprising, as we see it, should be nebulous and elusive; its 
resistance should never materialize as a concrete body . . . . On the other 
hand, there must be some concentration at certain points: the fog must 
thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of 
lightning may strike at any time. 
Id. 
63 See, e.g., Former Vice President Al Gore, Address at New York University 
(May 26, 2004) (transcript available http://www.moveon.org/pac/gore-
rumsfeld-transcript.html) (alluding to the reputational toll the Abu Ghraib 
incident imposed on the United States).  
64 See, e.g., Vatican Calls Prison Abuse a Bigger Blow to U.S. than Sept. 11, USA. 
TODAY, May 12, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-12-
vatican-iraqi-abuse_x.htm (condemning the United States for its detention 
practices in Guantanamo Bay).  
65 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Just Shut It Down, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/27/opinion/27friedman.html (urging for the 
closure of the Guantánamo facility). 
66 See id.  See also Maajid Nawaz, The Islamist Narrative, DAWN.COM, June 21, 
2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/26584 (discussing the corrosive effect 
of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo on both trust for the United States and respect 
for human rights); Spencer Ackerman, Five Years Later, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 19, 
2008, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=five_years_later 
(determining that torture images from Abu Ghraib were prime motivators for 
drawing recruits to Al-Qaeda in Iraq). 
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honest fashion.67  Indeed, one commentator has dubbed it ―the U.S. 
military‘s most serious setback since 9/11.‖68 
The tendency for incumbents to react harshly towards captured 
insurgents (or suspected insurgents) is perhaps most graphically 
seen in the memoirs of General Paul Aussaresses.  Aussaresses 
served as the primary counterinsurgency implementation officer 
for General Massu, the prefect of the city of Algiers during the 
Battle of Algiers (Jan–March 1957),69 and was most directly 
responsible for French action against the FLN insurgency there.70  
Aussaresses‘s extremely candid memoir provides a great deal of 
insight into the position of a determined incumbent willing to 
target a civilian population.  A conversation he had with a superior 
officer, Colonel de Cockborne, places the issue of insurgent 
treatment in the starkest light possible: 
―And how do you handle the suspects afterwards?‖ asked 
the colonel. 
―You mean once they‘ve talked?‖ 
―That‘s right.‖ 
―If they‘re connected to the crimes perpetrated by the 
terrorists, I shoot them.‖ 
―But you do understand that the bulk of the FLN is 
involved in terrorism!‖ answered de Cockborne. 
―Yes, I know that.‖ 
 
67 See JANE MEYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS  312–313 (2008) (discussing 
public perception of American detention practices). 
68 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-Century Conflicts?, 
54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34, 34 (2009). 
69 HORNE, supra note 53, at 188 (chronicling Governor-General Lacoste‘s 
assignment of General Jacques Massu, a seasoned warrior commander, to 
confront the pied noir counterinsurgency ―with total force . . . backed by the will to 
use it‖).  
70 PAUL AUSSARESSES, THE BATTLE OF THE CASBAH: TERRORISM AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM IN ALGERIA 1955–1957, at 72 (Robert L. Miller trans., 3d ed. 2006) 
(describing Aussaresses‘s role as a deputy in charge of maintaining close ties to 
the police departments, regimental commanders, and intelligence officers). 
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―Wouldn‘t it be better to hand them over to the judicial 
system rather than execute them?  We can‘t just go around 
knocking off every member of an organization!  It‘s crazy!‖ 
―But, Colonel, that‘s what the highest governmental 
authorities have decided.  The courts don‘t want to handle 
the FLN precisely because there are too many of them, 
because we wouldn‘t know where to put them, and because 
we can‘t just send hundreds of people to the guillotine.  The 
justice system is set up to handle a peacetime situation in 
metropolitan France.  This is Algeria, where a war is about 
to start. . . . One thing is very clear:  our mission demands 
results, requiring torture and summary executions, and as 
far as I can see it‘s only beginning.‖71 
While public opinion was certainly a factor to the French 
counterinsurgents in Algeria, as witnessed by Aussaresses‘s 
comment (quoted above) that ―we can‘t just send hundreds of 
people to the guillotine,‖ this did not deter the French government 
from sanctioning the extralegal execution of captured FLN 
members.72  Aussaresses mentions a magistrate reporting directly 
to the Minister of Justice who all but instructed Aussaresses to kill 
FLN leader Larbi Ben M‘Hidi: 
―That‘s exactly what I mean.  If you didn‘t search him [the 
captured Ben M‘Hidi], you didn‘t find his cyanide capsule.‖ 
―What are you talking about?‖ 
―Well,‖ said Bérard, pronouncing each word carefully, ―I 
won‘t be teaching you anything you don‘t already know.  
All the top leaders [of the FLN] have a cyanide capsule.  It‘s 
a well-known fact.‖ 
What Bérard wanted to say, since he represented the 
judiciary, was extremely clear to me . . . .73 
The Algerian case is an example of counterinsurgency practice 
supplanting the rule of law.  As Aussaresses‘s quotes indicate, the 
 
71 Id. at 21–22. 
72 See id. at 15 (―[Policemen] spoke in hushed voices but were not ashamed of 
using methods that everyone in the government back in Paris was well aware of . . 
. .‖). 
73 Id. at 136–37. 
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French authorities, both civil and military, considered the French 
judicial system inadequate for dealing with FLN members. 
It is a blunt reality that any counterinsurgency must and will 
engage in both detention and interrogation of suspected 
insurgents.  Some commentators, like Aussaresses, suggest that 
torture is another one of the blunt realities presented in such a 
situation, commenting that ―once a country demands that its army 
fight an enemy who is using terror to compel an indifferent 
population to join its ranks and provoke a repression that will in 
turn outrage international public opinion, it becomes impossible 
for that army to avoid using extreme measures.‖74  Others take the 
approach of Alistair Horne, who notes that along with the 
corrosive moral effects associated with torture,75 the long-term 
costs from torture to French strategic goals in Algeria were 
tremendous:  the anger from French torture neutralized any 
moderate Algerian Muslims (described as the ―interlocuteurs 
valables‖ by Horne) who might have been able to achieve peace 
earlier, and also weakened domestic public opinion in France to a 
degree that continued efforts in Algeria were unsustainable.76 
Neither Horne nor Aussaresses addresses directly, or in any 
great detail, the effect of torture policies on the rule of law in 
particular.  Given Aussaresses‘s distaste for the capabilities of the 
judicial system (―Even if the law had been enforced in all its 
harshness, few persons would have been executed . . . .‖77  ―[T]o 
hand the attorney over to the judicial system . . . meant, in effect, 
granting him impunity . . . .‖78), this is understandable.  However, 
Horne does include a response from a French paratrooper 
commander that highlights why the decision to torture is so 
pernicious to establishing the rule of law, stating ―the army had 
come to regard a prisoner as ‗no longer an Arab peasant‘ but 
simply ‗a source of intelligence.‘‖79  The prisoners were no longer 
 
74 Id. at xxxiv. 
75 See HORNE, supra note 53, at 200–01 (examining the effects of French torture 
practices in Algeria on the torturers). 
76 See id. at 206–07 (analyzing the long-term effects that a policy sanctioning 
torture in Algeria had on public opinion of France in Algeria and within France 
itself). 
77 AUSSARESSES, supra note 70, at 128. 
78 Id. at 146. 
79 HORNE, supra note 53, at 198. 
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individuals entitled to the protection of the law, but simply 
intelligence resources. 
This trend towards dehumanization becomes even more 
pernicious when one considers that false identification of 
insurgents is a relatively common phenomenon.  As Kalyvas & 
Kocher point out, during an insurgency ―[s]tates (as well as 
challengers) rely on individual informants who have incentives to 
denounce their personal or local enemies.‖80  Even without 
personal incentives like those mentioned by Kalyvas & Kocher 
(informants extorting women for sexual favors and threatening to 
term them Viet Cong members, or naming a loan holder a Viet 
Cong member in order to avoid paying a debt81), the 
counterinsurgent is likely to provide incentives for naming 
insurgency members.  For a current example, the BBC reported in 
2006 that most detainees at Guantánamo Bay were not brought in 
by American forces, but instead by bounty hunters, and only eight 
percent (42 of the then 517 detainees at Guantánamo) were 
confirmed al Qaeda fighters.82 
If taken to its extremes, the depersonalization of the populace 
can ultimately result in Hama-like policies.  The Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency campaign—the period between 1980 and 1983 
dubbed ‗la violencia‘—contained an estimated 422 massacres 
committed by the belligerent parties.83  Of the 422 massacres, 
which resulted in approximately 14,000 deaths, it is estimated that 
the Guatemalan government committed ninety percent of the 
killings.84 
One of the difficulties with reforming detention practices is the 
potential for conflict between detention goals.  It may seem like 
 
80 Kalyvas & Kocher, supra note 59, at 207. 
81 Id. at 207–08 (discussing the incentives used to extract information in 
raids). 
82 John Simpson, No Surprises in the War on Terror, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2006, 
3:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4708946.stm (―Some 86% [of 
detainees] were handed over in Afghanistan and Pakistan after a widespread 
campaign in which big financial bounties were offered in exchange for anyone 
suspected of links to al-Qaeda and the Taleban.‖). 
83 Nathanael Heasley et al., Impunity in Guatemala: The State’s Failure to Provide 
Justice in the Massacre Cases, 16 AM. U. INT‘L. L. REV. 1115, 1121–22 (2001) 
(describing data compiled by the Recovery of Historical Memory Project on the 
Guatemalan massacres). 
84 Id. 
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aggressive detention policies are most likely to be effective at 
curtailing an insurgency by removing the insurgents from the 
population quickly.  However, this can easily backfire if the 
incumbent is not careful and discriminating in detention policies.  
Over-broad detention of the populace can easily cause the 
population to begin supporting the insurgency.85 
3.2. Uniting Traditional Sources of Law and Governance with 
Establishing the Rule of Law 
Due to the extreme pressures placed upon a society that is 
undergoing an insurgency, an incumbent is placed in a position of 
significant power over the legal framework and construction of the 
society.  Yet, for an incumbent‘s governance to be considered 
legitimate, it must be a method of governance that is met with a 
certain amount of approval from the populace.  The governance 
promulgated by an incumbent must be integrated into the cultural 
and social mores of a given society.86  In situations where 
alternative means of governance have been established, such as 
local institutions not established by the incumbent, an incumbent 
may be forced to accommodate these alternative means in order to 
establish its own legitimacy and promote stability.87  While the 
incumbent may seem to be the dominant actor on the scene, they 
must bow to the political and practical realities of the situation; 
only by using overwhelming force against a populace can the 
populace be coerced into accepting a legal framework that it finds 
to be fundamentally illegitimate.88 
 
85 See JOES, supra note 22, at 156 (discussing the consequences of indiscriminate 
severity against the population during a counterinsurgency). 
86 See Rachel Kleinfeld & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Can a Post-Colonial Power Export 
The Rule of Law? Elements of a General Framework, in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 
139, 148 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker eds., 2009) (―The rule of law is 
about the relationship between state and society, and citizens must generally 
follow the law without enforcement; only a despotic state will have the power to 
enforce an ‗alien‘ rule of law.‖). 
87 See Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, The Art of Seeing Like a State: 
State-Building in Afghanistan, the Congo, and Beyond, REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 
(forthcoming), available at www.ccoyne.com/The_Art_of_Seeing_Like_a_State.pdf 
(discussing the role of non-governmental institutions and governance, 
particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan). 
88 See Mark Martins, Lawfare: So Are We Waging It?, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2010), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/11/lawfare-so-are-we-waging-it/ (―Security 
rooted in such force may earn a government a short season of willing allegiance 
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However, this does raise potential tensions with some of the 
principles of the rule of law discussed at the outset of this 
Comment.  Several societies possess mixed legal systems, 
combining civil codes with religious legal frameworks.89  
Furthermore, the legal system itself may be bifurcated, with 
parallel judicial and dispute-resolution systems existing 
simultaneously, as is the case in regions of both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan; the traditional jirga, a tribal council, often issues legal 
rulings and resolves disputes, rather than sending them to the 
state‘s justice system.90  The degree of bifurcation can vary:  an 
April 2009 investigation of Afghanistan‘s Helmand Province found 
that in some districts, judges integrated elements of the jirgas into 
their courts, while in others, the formal judicial system is virtually 
non-existent.91  The informal justice system is estimated to ―deal 
with at least 90% of all dispute resolution in Helmand.‖92 
Bifurcation of the judicial system can be a significant problem 
for the incumbent during a counterinsurgency.  As discussed supra 
Section 1.1.2, an insurgent will seek to out-administer the 
incumbent, and the judiciary plays a significant role in the 
governance of any given territory.  By exploiting the tensions that 
inherently exist between the components of a bifurcated legal 
system, an insurgent can carve out a socially accepted role for its 
own governance.  For example, the Taliban exploited the tensions 
between the official Afghan legal system (the formal tool of the 
government) and the jirgas (the informal, traditional method of 
resolving disputes) to create its own traveling courts,93 which were 
 
from a population grateful to be relieved of attacks, but legitimacy—and 
effectiveness beyond the near term—comes from more than power alone.‖). 
89 See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.‘S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY & CTR. FOR 
LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER‘S GUIDE 
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 114 (2010), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au 
/awc/awcgate/law/rule_of_law_hdbk.pdf [hereinafter RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK] 
(discussing mixed legal systems, including civil, common law systems and civil 
law and religious legal systems). 
90 See Niloufer Siddiqui, Broken Justice, FOREIGN POL‘Y, AFPAK CHANNEL (Feb. 
1, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/01 
/broken_justice (examining the bifurcated legal system of Pakistan‘s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas). 
91 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 268–71. 
92 Id. at 274. 
93 See Gary Anderson, The Closers (Part III): Civilians in the Hold Phase, SMALL 
WARS J. 1, 9 (Mar. 3, 2011, 3:39 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com 
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then perceived to dispense speedier and fairer justice than either 
pre-existing legal system.94 
When faced with a bifurcated judicial system, an incumbent 
may opt to integrate the bifurcation into the existing formalized 
legal system, as was done in Helmand Province.  By explicitly 
authorizing the use of the informal justice system for non-criminal 
dispute resolution or minor crimes, while funneling serious cases 
to the formal system,95 both the traditional and the formal systems 
ideally gain legitimacy.  The traditional system will hopefully be 
recognized as a part of the nation‘s legal infrastructure, while 
leaders of the traditional system (religious leaders of the 
community and tribal leaders) become more willing to support the 
formal legal system.  The danger in this approach is that instead of 
enhancing legitimacy for both sides, this may present the 
incumbent as weak, unable to fully enforce the use of its judicial 
system.  The flip side of this is that attempting to interfere too 
much with the informal justice system may be perceived as 
government over-interference with the traditional beliefs, values, 
and mores of the population, and may cause an upswing in 
insurgent support. 
Even without systemic issues such as bifurcation of the judicial 
system, rule of law actions taken in a counterinsurgency campaign 
have the potential to make major changes to the fabric of a 
society.96  The incumbent must therefore be cognizant of the legal 
basis and the sources of law that are being used to establish 
governance for a population.  What if the pre-existing sources of 
law conflict with components of the rule of law which the 
government is seeking to establish?  For example, utilizing 
traditional sources of law regarding the status of women or of 
 
/blog/journal/docs-temp/685-anderson.pdf (explaining how the Taliban courts 
have filled the void left by unresponsive government courts). 
94 See Andrew Garfield, What Afghans Want 1, 5–6, FOREIGN POL‘Y RES. INST., 
E-NOTES, (November, 2009), http://www.glevumassociates.com/doc 
/WhatAfghansWant.pdf (describing corruption in the central government and 
limited judicial access as areas of primary concern to Afghans); RULE OF LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 205, 269 (suggesting reasons that Taliban judicial 
systems were sometimes favored by Afghans). 
95 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 274–75 (explaining why 
having a bifurcated justice system is reasonable in Helmand). 
96 See Note, Counterinsurgency and Constitutional Design, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1622, 1630 (2008) (arguing that counterinsurgency can function as de facto 
constitutional design). 
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minority groups may decrease the protection of human rights,97 
which (as discussed supra Sections 1.1.1, 1.2) is considered a 
significant component of the rule of law.  One embarrassing 
example of poor selection of sources of law is evident in the 1999 
UN intervention in Kosovo.  To ensure that a legal system was in 
place, the head of the UN civilian administration issued a 
regulation stating that pre-intervention law, enacted before March 
24, 1999 (the date of the intervention), would be the law of the 
land, without realizing that the bulk of the Kosovar population 
viewed the laws of the time as fundamentally oppressive and 
imposed upon them by a Serb minority.98 
One solution advanced by some scholars to the problem of 
potential human rights violations in legal sources is to lay the 
grounds for systemic changes in society through a ―bottom-up 
development policy‖ of strengthening institutions of civil society 
(such as the educational system, press, and non-government 
organizations). 99 This method has the potential for great effect, but 
it is intrinsically a long-term solution, focusing as it does on a 
gradual cultural change.  An incumbent must seek both long-term 
and short-term solutions.  
A legal framework will obviously be strongest when the 
population it governs believes that it is authentic and not 
externally imposed.100  This applies to both peaceful situations as 
well as situations involving counterinsurgency.  In an article for 
the blog Lawfare, Thomas Nachbar addresses this problem: 
Codified rules or government practices that enhance 
security but lack a connection to a population‘s normative 
commitments similarly lack legitimacy—such laws are 
what Hart described as mere rules backed by force, not law.  
 
97 See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 270–71 (examining 
weaknesses in the informal judicial system of Helmand Province). 
98 STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 316–17 (describing how ―well-intentioned 
rule of law promotion efforts can sometimes inadvertently undermine the rule of 
law‖). 
99 See Kleinfeld & Nicolaidis, supra note 86, at 161–62 (discussing the 
―bottom-up‖ approach to development which employs indirect methods such as 
providing funding to NGOs). 
100 See, e.g., id. at 157 (noting that EU officials decided against conditioning 
funding on the passage of a law because the Albanian population would 
purportedly deem it illegitimate and unenforceable due to the presence of the 
external conditionality). 
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Thus counterinsurgency doctrine‘s central place for 
legitimacy is doubly the case for uses of law in 
counterinsurgency . . . . [T]he inextricable connection 
between this particular tool of counterinsurgency and the 
population‘s underlying normative commitments makes 
any attempt to use law without attention to its grounding 
in those commitments—its legitimacy—unwise and likely 
counterproductive.101 
The incumbent must not overreach beyond the limits of the society 
it is a part of.  As Stromseth and her co-authors note, ―The rule of 
law is as much a culture as a set of institutions, as much a matter of 
the habits, commitments, and beliefs of ordinary people as of legal 
codes.‖102  By overextending, the incumbent would decrease the 
chances for lasting rule of law reform. 
3.3. Legal Constraints on the Incumbent 
Due to the practical realities of counterinsurgency (or indeed, 
any sort of warfare), forces of the incumbent will commit crimes 
against the populace.  The question then arises:  How is the 
incumbent to respond to these crimes?  The international law of 
occupation is considered to be encompassed in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Hague Convention, and the nebulous area of 
customary international law,103 but these do not provide significant 
guidance on the extent to which an incumbent is bound by its legal 
codes during a counterinsurgency.104  A significant amount of 
tension exists on this point.  While state accountability to its own 
legal system is a pillar of the rule of law, how much is an 
incumbent government willing to submit to constraints that may 
impede its ability to act? 
 
101 Thomas Nachbar, Lawfare and the Authority of Law, LAWFARE (Jan. 4, 2011, 
10:22 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/01/tom-nachbar-on-lawfare-
and-the-authority-of-law. 
102 STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 4, at 310. 
103 See Walker, supra note 51, at 260 (noting that the Geneva Convention, the 
Hague Convention, and customary international law traditionally make up the 
international law of belligerent occupation). 
104 See id. at 275 (noting that the Conventions are often silent regarding the 
scope of authority by occupiers in some realms). 
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Thomas Nachbar suggests that legal constraints on the 
incumbent can act as a significant force multiplier for the 
incumbent in the long term: 
Sometimes that commitment will actually result in a short-
term victory for insurgents—what some might call the 
insurgents‘ ―unfair‖ use of law to hinder military 
prosecution of the conflict.  Perhaps the most salient 
measure of the legitimacy of any state are the rules (and 
maybe even more importantly the degree to which the state 
follows them) that govern its exertion of force, especially 
exertion of force against its own citizens.  As General 
Martins argues, ―[c]ompliance with law is what legitimates 
the actions of our troops and separates their actions—
sometimes necessarily violent and lethal—from what very 
bad people in criminal mobs do.‖  If General Martins is 
correct that most people would rather live under a state 
that is governed by law rather than the will of men (and I 
think he is), this use of law may be the most powerful one 
in the conduct of a counterinsurgency—to again borrow 
General Martins‘ terminology, this is the way the 
government outflanks insurgents.105 
In other words, the tactical loss present in a delayed military 
prosecution of the conflict yields a strategic gain in the form of 
separating the incumbent from the insurgent, one where the rule of 
law provides a justification to the population as to why supporting 
the incumbent is the superior choice. 
However, this cannot suffice on its own to demonstrate the 
worthwhile nature of a government.  While curtailing its activities 
through the lens of the rule of law, an incumbent must also be able 
to effectively prosecute the armed conflict portion of 
counterinsurgency.  As Mark Martins notes, ―If a government lacks 
the power to defend itself and its people against violence and 
predatory corruption, it will be discredited and regarded as 
illegitimate even if it brings itself to adhere scrupulously to the law 
and otherwise comes to be deserving of allegiance.‖106 
 
105 Nachbar, supra note 101. 
106 Martins, supra note 88. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
06 KAZMI (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2012  11:23 AM 
896 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 33:3 
Peter Stirk suggests that equal treatment between an external 
incumbent and the population is impossible:  ―Even where 
occupiers have sought justice, it has never been a justice of the 
equality of all before the law, of common subjection to the same 
rules, for the rules and the structural nature of military occupation 
have assigned a different status to the occupier and inhabitant.‖107  
Some external incumbents have sought to constrain the actions of 
their own forces and provide accountability, but even these 
incumbents have consistently avoided placing their forces under 
the jurisdiction of the population‘s court system.108 
While there are extreme legal constraints that an incumbent is 
not likely to apply to itself, it is in the best interest of an incumbent 
to ensure that the populace perceives it as being fair (along with 
the incumbent actually being fair), and legal constraints help to 
demonstrate this.109  The United States Foreign Claims Act 
provides an example of the type of legislation which incumbents 
will likely use.  The Foreign Claims Act takes some steps to 
provide legal constraints, by providing a method by which 
individuals may obtain redress for claims against the American 
military.  However, the Act restricts claims to instances not arising 
in combat.110 
It is not enough for an incumbent government to act in a 
legitimate manner; it must also be perceived to be acting in a 
legitimate manner.111  Due to the likely antagonistic relationship 
between the incumbent and the population, this perception of 
legitimacy may be one of the most difficult tasks the incumbent 
faces.  Even in circumstances where incumbent forces are held 
accountable for potential human rights violations and go through 
 
107 PETER M.R. STIRK, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION 195 (2009). 
108 See id. at 183–89 (discussing attempts by occupiers to exercise legal 
accountability over their own forces, but noting the occupiers‘ hesitance to 
prosecute their forces within the indigenous legal systems). 
109 Anthony James Joes‘s discussion of the concept of ―rectitude,‖ meaning 
right action towards the populace, mirrors this concept to some extent.  See JOES, 
supra note 22, at 156–65 (detailing the concept of rectitude, which holds that forces 
should act lawfully and according to upstanding moral standards). 
110 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3) (2006) (stating that a claim may only be allowed if, 
inter alia, ―it did not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly 
from an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat‖). 
111 See Dunlap, supra note 68, at 35 (noting that improper acts by an 
incumbent or lack of public support for an incumbent can undermine perceptions 
of its legitimacy). 
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trial procedures, the public may still not deem such recourse as 
legitimate.  For example, after the 2005 Haditha massacre in Iraq 
(twenty-four Iraqis died from American fire after an American 
convoy was hit by an improvised explosive device (IED)),112 all but 
one of the Marines involved in the incident either had the charges 
against them dropped or were found not guilty.113  Due to the 
sensitive and shocking nature of the incident and the perceived 
lack of legitimacy on the part of the United States by the Iraqi 
people, the decisions to drop charges were met with skepticism 
and disbelief.114  Because of the lack of legitimacy which the United 
States brought to the table, the entire trial mechanism was tainted 
in the eyes of the Iraqi populace. 
3.4. Amnesty versus Prosecution of Insurgents 
One of the most potentially problematic tensions between the 
requirements of counterinsurgency strategy and the establishment 
of the rule of law is the issue of amnesty towards insurgents, war 
criminals, and human rights violators.  Insurgencies rarely end 
through an incumbent‘s application of force; instead, they usually 
end through co-opting less committed members of the insurgency 
and integrating them into the incumbent‘s society.115  Joes points to 
 
112 See A Horror that Will Not Be Buried, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2006, 
http://www.economist.com/node/6999468?story_id=6999468&fsrc=RSS 
(discussing an investigation which revealed that U.S. troops participated in a 
massacre and killed Iraqi civilians, many of whom were believed to be unarmed). 
113 See Tony Perry, Court Hearing Begins for Marine in Iraqi Civilian Deaths, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 1:50 PM) http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow 
/2009/03/court-martial.html (noting that of the eight marines initially charged, 
―[c]ases against six of them [were] dropped, and one was found not guilty‖). 
114 For example, one Iraqi lamented: 
I‘m not satisfied with the outcome because the punishments don‘t come 
close to the crimes committed in Haditha.  We expected that the soldiers 
would be exonerated.  From the first moment, we expected that.  I 
thought the soldiers would be let off or claim insanity.  All of these 
excuses we expected from the beginning. 
Frontline: Rules of Engagement (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2008) (transcript 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haditha 
/etc/script.html). 
115 See Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that ―political 
accommodation,‖ and not military defeat, causes insurgencies to ―fade away‖); see 
also JOES, supra note 22, at 166–70 (noting that amnesty programs can be used as 
effective means of ending insurgencies). 
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the Chieu Hoi program operating during the Vietnam War—an 
amnesty program which ―‗had the most favorable cost/benefit 
ratio of any counterinsurgency operation in Viet Nam,‘‖—to 
suggest that an amnesty can be an extremely powerful tool for an 
incumbent.116  On the other hand, as Voorhoeve notes, ―It is 
particularly bitter to the population if war criminals are given 
amnesty as part of a cease-fire agreement or peace deal.  This is one 
of the harshest examples of the trade-off between peace and 
justice.‖117   
The trade-off between peace and justice trends towards peace 
in the eyes of most scholars considering the question.  As Schlunck 
notes, ―As long as those who are responsible for brutal crime either 
still hold positions with the government or form an influential 
constituency [like former members of an insurgency], they 
participate in the negotiations and the transition process.‖118  And 
even Schlunck, one of the drafters of the International Criminal 
Court, is forced to concede that ―the precondition for effective 
conflict management is the cessation of hostilities . . . . 
[N]egotiators will probably still take recourse to amnesties for 
massive human rights violations with a view to stopping the 
fighting.‖119  Joes suggests an alternate route for those 
uncomfortable with the idea of amnesty for insurgent leaders, 
proposing that ―no amnesty should be available to guerrillas 
accused of personal criminal acts; instead huge cash bounties 
should be placed on their heads.‖120  While this may seem 
attractive, the purpose of offering amnesty is to whittle away 
support from the insurgency and provide alternatives to its 
members; without the possibility of this amnesty, the most 
personally dangerous members will likely remain the most 
intransigent. 
An example of the amnesty process can be seen in Iraq‘s 
―Anbar Awakening.‖  In 2006, several (minority) Sunni tribes 
 
116 JOES, supra note 22, at 169 (quoting JEANNETTE A. KOCH, THE CHIEU HOI 
PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1963-1971, at vi (RAND, R-1172-ARPA, 1973), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports 
/2006/R1172.pdf). 
117 VOORHOEVE, supra note 7, at 111. 
118 SCHLUNCK, supra note 33, at 249. 
119 Id. 
120 JOES, supra note 22, at 167. 
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began seeking to move away from their former Al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) partners and instead partner with the United States and Iraqi 
governments.121  In some cases, members of the tribes had been 
former insurgents,122 but after noting that AQI seemed to be intent 
on supplanting the tribal structure for control of both smuggling 
operations in Anbar and tribal territory itself, they concluded that 
it was in their best interest to turn on AQI.123  In others, the AQI 
brutality towards family members and loved ones spurred them to 
throw in with the incumbents.124  
The incumbents took the opportunity presented by the 
cooperative tribes to bring them into the fold by using tribal forces 
as ―neighborhood watch groups,‖125 as well as integrating them 
into Iraqi police forces.126  With American funding, Sunni tribes 
were convinced to either switch allegiance to the incumbents or to, 
at the very least, remain neutral parties and refrain from aiding 
AQI.  While the prior actions of the Sunni tribal leaders were cause 
for concern, incumbent leaders ultimately concluded that the tribes 
would likely be ―reliable partners,‖ given their self-interested 
position of allying against al Qaeda.127  As tribes shifted allegiance, 
 
121 See Dave Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, SMALL WARS J. BLOG (Aug. 
29, 2007, 1:52 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt 
(describing how the self-interest of certain Iraqi tribes aligned with the interests of 
the United States and Iraqi governments against al Qaeda). 
122 See Colin Freeman, Iraqi Neighbours Rise Up Against al-Qa’eda, TELEGRAPH 
Apr. 12, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1584898/Iraqi-
neighbours-rise-up-against-al-Qaeda.html (explaining that many Iraqis, 
previously sympathetic with al Qaeda‘s anti-occupation message, began to view 
al Qaeda not as ―resistance fighters,‖ but as ―liars and terrorists‖). 
123 See John A. McCary, The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives, 32 
WASH. Q. 43, 47–48 (2009) (explaining that al Qaeda‘s violent political takeover of 
Anbar pushed some tribal leaders to ally with the United States). 
124 See Freeman, supra note 122 (detailing various incidences of brutality 
leveled by al Qaeda against the tribes). 
125 Id. 
126 See Thomas R. Searle, Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role 
of Special Operations Forces, 50 JOINT FORCE Q. 62, 65–66 (2008) (noting that tribal 
support led to a surge in police force volunteers, which was crucial for defeating 
al Qaeda). 
127 See Jim Michaels, An Army Colonel’s Gamble Pays Off in Iraq, USA TODAY, 
May 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-
colonel_n.htm (stating that a trust based on mutual self-interest developed 
between U.S. forces and tribal leaders; for example, U.S. forces gained ―an Iraqi 
police force,‖ while tribal leaders secured protection for their families). 
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insurgent attacks in their territory decreased dramatically.128  
However, by 2010 this promising picture had changed 
considerably.  The (largely Shia) Iraqi government took over 
administration of the Awakening program in 2008, prompting 
concerns from Sunnis that the government would start disbanding 
their units or even arresting former insurgent leaders.129  In 
September 2010, hundreds of Sunni tribesmen police, who had 
been integrated into Iraqi security forces, were dismissed by the 
Iraqi Interior Ministry,130 and many began rejoining AQI.131  As of 
the time of this Comment, the ultimate results of the Anbar 
Awakening remain to be seen. 
The amnesty offered to the Anbar Awakening members, along 
with the falling out between AQI and the Awakening tribes, 
caused the initial shift in the Awakening tribes from nominally 
insurgent-allied to allying with the incumbent.  This co-opting of 
the Sunni tribes did in fact provide greatly increased security to 
Anbar while the partnership was in effect.132  However, it is 
important to consider the ramifications of the Anbar Awakening 
beyond the increased security provided.  Firstly, the amnesty 
provided to the various tribal forces went beyond direct amnesty—
insurgency fighters were actually co-opted by the incumbents.  
However, the method by which the Sunni tribes were brought to 
 
128 See Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, supra note 121 (discussing a 
reduction in improvised explosive device (IED) and other attacks throughout 
various regions). 
129 See Erica Goode, U.S. Military Will Transfer Control of Sunni Citizen Patrols 
to Iraqi Government, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/09/02/world/middleeast/02iraq.html (describing some of the problems 
foreseen in a transfer of control over ―the Sunni-dominated citizen patrols known 
as Awakening Councils‖ to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government). 
130 See Leila Fadel, Sunni Awakening Officers are Kicked Off Police Force in Iraq, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/26/AR2010092603533.html (detailing a plan by the 
Iraqi Interior Ministry to remove scores of officers from the American police 
force). 
131 See Timothy Williams & Duraid Adnan, Sunnis in Iraq Allied With U.S. 
Rejoin Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010 
/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html?_r=1&ref=global-home 
(describing a change in loyalty by many members of the Awakening Councils, 
many ―rejoin[ing] Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia‖). 
132 See McCary, supra note 123, at 55 (noting the ―unprecedented level of 
cooperation and coordination‖ between U.S. military commanders and local tribal 
heads).  
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work with the incumbents meant that not only did the sheikhs 
continue to function as the local power brokers,133 but they began 
to function as a separate power bloc within Iraq.  The amnesties 
offered to the Sunni tribes were also possible in part because of 
their limited direct support for AQI; as one American officer noted, 
―There might be a few guys among them who were shooting at us 
before, but I would say that for most, the worst thing they might 
have done is maybe made the odd phone call on behalf of the 
insurgents.‖134   
Above all, it must be remembered that past counterinsurgency 
efforts in one nation do not necessarily translate to efforts in 
another.  American attempts to engineer an ―Afghan Awakening‖ 
amnesty and reintegration program based on the Anbar 
Awakening have resulted in a miniscule yield; an estimated three 
percent of Taliban fighters have chosen to engage with the Afghan 
Peace and Reintegration Program.135  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1. Synergistic Nature of Counterinsurgency and the Rule of Law 
As we have seen, counterinsurgency and the rule of law 
operate in a synergistic manner.  Safeguarding the rule of law 
demonstrates that a state is capable of governing effectively and in 
a legitimate fashion, which increases the willingness of a 
population to support the government.  A population-centric 
counterinsurgency will likely strengthen existing instruments of 
the rule of law, and take steps to ensure that the population is 
provided with governance they perceive as being authentic and 
legitimate. 
Furthermore, failures in one will harm the other.  By presenting 
a populace with illegitimate governance, an incumbent indicates 
that the insurgency is capable of providing better government—or 
 
133 See Kilcullen, Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt, supra note 121 (explaining the 
parallel power structure that exists in Iraq, with tribal leaders competing for 
power with the formal national government). 
134 Freeman, supra note 122. 
135 See Spencer Ackerman, A Year in, Amnesty Deal Lures Only Three Percent of 
Taliban, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom 
/2011/01/a-year-in-amnesty-deal-lures-only-3-percent-of-taliban/ (detailing the 
relatively modest success of an amnesty program in Afghanistan). 
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at least an equivalent form.  By failing to protect a population and 
ensure that security issues are dealt with, an incumbent will 
weaken societal reliance on governmental institutions such as the 
police or the courts. 
4.2. Strictly Short-Term Security Gains Damage Both 
Counterinsurgency and the Rule of Law 
An incumbent is put in a difficult position regarding its 
conduct in response to a counterinsurgency campaign.  If the 
violence of an insurgency is allowed to persist then the populace is 
likely to lose faith in the government,136 or possibly support the 
insurgent.137  However, the more direct measures the government 
takes to quell the insurgency, the more it may approach 
indiscriminate violence as described by Kalyvas & Kocher;138 the 
al-Assad method of counterinsurgency provides an extreme 
example. 
Co-opting the rule of law to the needs of a counterinsurgency 
effort may seem desirable for an incumbent, but this is ultimately 
penny-wise and pound-foolish.  Using the rule of law strictly as a 
method for strengthening a counterinsurgency, without paying 
heed to its aspects of accountability for the state or protection of 
human rights, would fatally wound the legitimacy of the rule of 
law.139 
A focus on measures designed to maximize short-term 
efficiency will also lead to a lack of sustainability.  Chappuis & 
Hänggi point to security sector reform in Afghanistan, where a 
―focus on operational capacity-building to the neglect of long-term 
 
136 See DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION 
FIASCO 158 (2005) (―As violence mounted, Iraqi resentment of the United States 
also increased.‖). 
137 See Kalyvas & Kocher, supra note 59, at 189–90 (explaining that when 
indiscriminate state violence increases, the population may look to the insurgent 
for protection from the state or even join the insurgent, who is more capable of 
selective violence). 
138 Id. at 210 (presenting data from the Greek Civil War indicating that 
noncombatants in the Argolid perished at higher rates than combatants because 
they were ―between two fires‖— targeted by both sides simultaneously). 
139 See Kilcullen Interview, supra note 43, at 3 (noting that because the Afghan 
government abused and oppressed the local population, town elders had expelled 
the government officials and embraced the Taliban in 2008; assessing the 
challenge of the Marjah operation begins with understanding the Taliban 
presence in the town as a symptom of Afghan government abuse). 
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training . . . led to a contradiction between human security and 
state security as the ability of the state to protect itself increased 
with the efficiency of the army but human security deteriorated in 
great part due to unsuccessful police reform.‖140  A surge requires 
the presence of large numbers of troops, forcing an incumbent to 
keep significant resources committed to that effort.  Successes in 
establishing security after a sudden influx of force may be 
potentially short-lived; successes in establishing the rule of law, 
with its requirements for equal treatment of citizens and 
constraints on the use of state power, will probably be even shorter 
in duration. 
4.3. Final Conclusions 
Some counterinsurgency experts are dubious about the utility 
of legitimacy to the incumbent.  When John Nagl was asked 
whether an illegitimate government could defeat an insurgency, he 
responded that ―the government only has to be seen as more 
legitimate and better for the population than the insurgents.‖141  
This is not entirely accurate.  While Nagl may be correct that the 
bare minimum legitimacy necessary for the government is simply 
to be ―better‖ than the insurgents, it is misleading to think that this 
bare minimum is likely to be an effective method of concluding a 
counterinsurgency.  Nagl‘s suggestion may be a possible method 
for convincing the populace of a nation to side with the incumbent, 
but it will not effectively demonstrate that the incumbent can 
provide security and legitimacy in the long term, and may even 
foster the conditions for another potential insurgency in the future. 
One criticism that may be levied against this work is that the 
suggestions for incumbents presented here represent objectives 
that are more aspirational than pragmatic.142  One commentator 
 
140 Chappuis & Hänggi, supra note 35, at 52. 
141 Nagl Interview, supra note 15, at 4. 
142 See Interview by Maria Costigan with Jaqueline Hazelton, Former 
Research Fellow, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int‘l Affairs in 
Cambridge, Ma. (Dec. 3, 2010) (video and transcript available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20860/interview_with_jacqueli
ne_jill_hazelton.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F2085%2Fjacqueline_l_hazelton
(arguing that the process of counterinsurgency as a form of state building, 
including limiting the use of  military force to prevent alienating civilians 
through casualties, is an ideal model that has never been successfully 
implemented). 
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has suggested that population-centric counterinsurgency ―doesn‘t 
bear any resemblance to what has succeeded in counterinsurgency 
in the past.‖143  In some ways this is true; population-centric 
methods have had mixed results while strongly coercive methods 
applied against the population certainly have been successful in 
the past, such as the actions of al-Assad in Syria and Aussaresses in 
Algeria.  At the same time, it is very possible that a population-
centric counterinsurgency is the only one that a nation even 
somewhat concerned with human rights and the rule of law can 
hope to wage effectively.  One of the most fundamental 
determining factors in warfare is the willingness of a nation to 
continue engaging in the conflict.144  If an incumbent government 
adopts a strategy fundamentally hostile to the norms of its 
population base, concern over the nature of the conflict will 
ultimately sap the incumbent‘s willingness to continue fighting 
and render the entire conflict pointless. 
When writing of the French army‘s defeat at the hands of the 
Wehrmacht during the Second World War, historian Eugenia 
Kiesling noted that ―Daladier and Gamelin worked within the 
institutions of the Republic they served. . . . [The French army] was 
an army unready for war against the Wehrmacht in 1940, but it 
could not have been different and remained the army of the Third 
Republic.‖145  Similarly, any incumbent power will be constrained 
by the de facto limits that its society imposes upon it.  As Alistair 
Horne suggests, by 1962, the violence of the Algerian War, and in 
particular, the actions of the Organisation de l‘armée secrète 
(O.A.S.), a right-wing French nationalist group fighting for French 
control of Algeria, were the tipping factors in the ultimate loss of 
public support for a French presence in Algeria.146  Turmoil over 
French conduct in the Algerian war had already contributed to the 
 
143 Id. 
144 See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 12, at 90 (discussing the varying ability of 
political objectives to mobilize the forces required for war, including public 
support). 
145 EUGENIA C. KIESLING, ARMING AGAINST HITLER: FRANCE AND THE LIMITS OF 
MILITARY PLANNING 188 (1996). 
146 See HORNE, supra note 53, at 504 (discussing anti-government sentiment of 
the French public following police violence at a civilian rally protesting O.A.S. 
violence in Algeria). 
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French government collapse in May 1958.147  It is not unreasonable 
to suggest that if an incumbent goes beyond a certain threshold of 
brutality in a counterinsurgency campaign, it will likely face 
domestic difficulties similar to the French government. 
How, then, can a democratic incumbent effectively wage a 
counterinsurgency?  The best option is to engage in population-
centric counterinsurgency while continuing to support the rule of 
law.  This is not an easy process.  No war is.  But support for the 
rule of law within counterinsurgency efforts affords the incumbent 
the best chance for a successful counterinsurgency campaign—of 
removing incentives for insurgency and building a lasting peace.  
 
 
147 Id. at 273–98 (examining the Algerian impetus to de Gaulle‘s 1958 assent to 
power). 
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